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Abstract
This paper develops a game theory optimization model of market efficiency and derives
conditions under which voluntary pooling is sustained for US/Canada durum and hard red spring
wheat producers. Analysis reveals that United States and Canadian farmers can increase farm
returns with efficiency gains from pooling and by internalizing benefits from grain blending and
logistics. The model is used to analyze diverse factors affecting the sustainability of such a pool.
Key Words: Voluntary pooling, game theory, efficiency gains, US/Canada wheat trade Operational Efficiency of US/Canada Wheat Pool: A Game Theory Analysis
In 1998, North Dakota farmers proposed a marketing pool for durum and hard red spring
(HRS) wheat produced in the United States and Canada.  The main purpose of the pool would be
to enhance farm income of wheat growers. Since 1996, durum and HRS wheat prices have been
declining.  Data from USDA-ERS indicate that U.S. durum and HRS wheat growers experienced
a 41.1 percent and 34.6 percent decrease in price respectively from1996 to1999.  In 1999, the
durum price was at a record low of $2.75/bu.  Declining wheat prices have caused many farmers
to quit farming.  In 1997 three out of ten farms had negative net farm income in North Dakota
(Swenson). The number of acres planted for HRS wheat in the United States has decreased by
23.4 percent or 4.68 million acres since 1996, and durum acreage declined by 320,000 acres or
8.8 percent in 1997 (USDA/ERS). 
There are two major propositions about the causes of declining wheat prices: over-
production, and reduced government protection under the 1996 Federal Agricultural
Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR Act).  Declining durum and HRS wheat prices have
coincided with the new farm Act.  On the other hand, declining price trends have persisted despite
declining wheat acreage and production in the U.S.  It is plausible that decreased government
protection may have contributed to price variability.  Also, the fact that prices of value-added
wheat products like flour and pasta, have not changed significantly and in some instances have
increased (Milling and Baking News, multiple) suggests that margins are shifting from producers
to either grain merchandisers or processors.  This is the primary motivation of this paper: to
investigate whether the formation of a wheat pool can enable farmers to internalize benefits that
are otherwise shifted to grain merchandisers or processors, and investigate how the proposed
wheat pool can sustain long-run profits and prices.  Another economic motivation for a pool
would be to decrease farmer’ reliance on government assistance and payments.
1  This paper
analyzes effective economic strategies and solutions to long-run price and revenue stability to
wheat growers through the proposed U.S./Canada wheat pool.  The rest of the paper is organized
in four major sections.  First, we discuss background and prior feasibility studies of the wheat
pool.  Second, the limitations of a pool depending entirely on market power (under conditions of
imperfect competition) are developed. In the third section, we develop a game theory model to
analyze efficiency gains from pooling with nonlinear pricing schemes. Finally, the model is used to
analyze diverse factors affecting the sustainability of U.S./Canada wheat pool.
Background 
There have been several meetings between U.S./Canadian farmers and officers from the
Prairie provinces and the Northern plains to explore possibilities for cross-border cooperation,
including a wheat pool.
2  Although U.S. production and acreage under production have been
declining since 1996, Canadian exports to the United States have been increasing (Figure 1).   The
impact of Canadian exports on prices received by farmers and net farm income in the United
States is a highly debated issue and several studies (Sumner, Alston, and Gray; Babula, Jabara,
and Reeder; and Koo, among others) have been conducted.  In theory, a pool can be used to
increase net income if it controls a significant share of production and can practice price
discrimination between various market segments. Cooperation between Canadian and Northern
Plain farmers may enable the pool to control more than 50 percent of the durum and HRS2
production.  In principle, it maybe unrealistic for pool members to rely entirely on market power
to increase net farm income (Koo et al.). Previous attempts to create wheat pools in the Northern
Plain have had limited success because of their emphasis on market power.  In general, producers
will seek to market their grain independently if they believe they can earn a higher return than
offered by the pool.  Since the pool return represents a weighted average of domestic and export
sales, producers who are able to sell at the high domestic price (while avoiding the costs of pool
participation) will choose to do so.  For the pool to attract a sizable base of producers, it must
offer advantages to offset this tendency.
3  Similar concerns arise with respect to free riders in
other regions.  To the extent that a higher domestic price elicits an increase in production in other
regions, the market power of a pool is diminished.  
This suggests that long-term viability of the pool may depend on marketing and
operational efficiencies or competitive advantages that are not shared by other grain trading firms. 
Among the areas where the pool could develop competitive advantages are grain blending,
logistics, and strategic quality management. While the net benefits of grain blending, logistical
advantages, and quality management are difficult to project, it is important to recognize that such
benefits may be crucial to the long-term viability of the pool. The analysis in this paper develops
these ideas more formally, using concepts of game theory. 
Market Power Shortfalls 
Several authors have discussed the limitations a pool may face in its attempt to earn 
higher prices via market power.  Examples of these limitations that may apply to the U.S./Canada
wheat pool are free rider problem (Koo et al.),
4 and imperfect competition (Sexton and Zhang). 
These two shortfalls are discussed to provide economic and theoretical justification of efficiency
gains analysis in a game theory framework.  First, the shortfalls due to free-riders are discussed
graphically. A marketing pool is similar to a cartel that must deal with competitive fringe
suppliers.  Those who do not participate in the pool are fringe suppliers.  They stand to gain if the
pool succeeds in raising the market price, but incur none of the costs of  participation; this makes
them ‘free-riders’.  The linear line D represents the demand schedule for a single time period and
Sp is the supply schedule of pool members (Figure 2). Given the supply of the competitive fringe
members (schedule Snp), the excess demand curve ED facing pool members can be drawn.  MR is
the marginal revenue associated with ED.  The pool will equate MR with the supply curve Sp and
charge price P1 to maximize its profit.  At this price the pool’s supply is 0Q1 and fringe suppliers
will sell Q1Q2. The price for the fringe suppliers is P1,   which is higher than in the absence of a
pool. Without the pool, the fringe would only receive price Pf.  
Fringe suppliers can increase returns by pricing at the pool price P1.  At the free-trade
price Pf , the fringe suppliers sell Q3Q4 while the pool sells 0Q3. Fringe suppliers gain
proportionally more from the pool than do pool members; this is mainly because the fringe
suppliers increase supply at the higher price, while members reduce supply.  The fringe suppliers’
revenue increases from area PfhQ40 to area P1gQ20, indicating that, free riders are better off under
the pool.  The pool’s revenue changes from area PfeQ30 to area P1fQ10.  This implies that long-
run price increases may not be sustained by the pool if pool members increase supply.  
Second, Sexton and Zhang provide a detailed discussion of price determination under
conditions of imperfect competition. They show that under imperfect competition the benefits3
from commercialization are captured by middlemen-grain merchandisers or processors in this
case.  There are several large grain merchandisers and processors in the United States and Canada
that the pool will compete against.
5  These companies may offer incentives to farmers to serve as
fringe suppliers to the pool. Consequently, the pool has to develop sustainable competitive
advantages to compete in an imperfect environment.  The pool can internalize blending and
logistic benefits by providing the functions of the middlemen.  Thus, long-run sustainability of the
pool may come to depend solely on efficiency gains and good business savvy. The free-rider
problem and imperfect competition have been advanced in the literature by many authors (Schmitz
et al. and Kraft et al) as reasons why a voluntary pool may not succeed. Their analysis and
propositions were based on market power rather that efficiency gains from pooling.    In the next
section, we develop a game theory model of market efficiency to analyze the sustainability of a
wheat pool in a free-rider environment. 
 
Methodology and Data Sources
Game theory has been used extensively in the literature to analyze market efficiency under
alternative market conditions (Osborne and Rubinstein).  In this study, game theory is used to
determine and analyze the conditions for sustainability of the U.S./Canada wheat pool under
alternative incentive schemes for pool members and punishment strategies for non-pool members. 
A major limitation of the U.S./Canada wheat pool discussed in section 2 is the free-rider problem. 
Game theory suggests a punishment strategy that can overcome the free-rider problem.  Free-
riders do not receive the efficiency gains from grain blending and logistical advantages of the
pool.
Blending activities are recognized as one of the principal sources of profit for grain
elevators and merchandisers (Fulton and Hucq). Wheat is blended for a variety of grade and non-
grade factors (e.g., protein, dockage, vomitoxin), based on premium and discount schedules that
vary across markets and through time.  Profit opportunities are greatest when there are shortages
of high-quality grain or large price spreads for particular quality characteristics—as occurred in
1993/94, for example, because of the scab outbreak.
6  Given the prevalence of blending in the
grain industry, it is reasonable to think this could be an important activity for the wheat pool.  To
the extent that this replaces grain blending by private firms, the effect would be to capture new
benefits for producers.   Moreover, the pool’s access to wheat stocks in a wide geographic area,
combined with information on qualities available by location, would ensure greater blending
opportunities than are available to local elevators.            
The pool may have additional advantages in the area of transportation and logistics. 
Unlike local elevators that must bid for grain, the pool could arrange for farmer deliveries at
specified times and locations (shipping points) in order to meet sale commitments.  With an
assured supply, much of the logistical uncertainty is removed, forward sales are facilitated, and
favorable shipping rates can be logged in more easily.   In addition, the pool would have greater
flexibility to assemble large shipments (e.g., by unit train) in response to short-term market
incentives. With the cooperation of producers, a pool could have unparalleled access to
information on the distribution of grain quality, by location, and across a geographical growing
region.  This would enable the efficient matching of supplies with quality requirements of
individual buyers.  Strategic quality management would entail the selective targeting of market4
segments and, in some cases, development of long-term supply arrangements based on customer
requirements for quality assurance. Arguably, the pool would be better placed to enter long-term
supply arrangements than private grain trading firms.  A game theory model is used to analyze
short and long run sustainable conditions given free riders or fringe suppliers and to determine
whether farmers are better off joining a wheat pool.
Baby Version of the Folk Theorem: In an infinitely repeated game, cooperation is the
equilibrium outcome if a punishment strategy is defined so that it makes players worse-off when
they deviate from the cooperative solution (Kreps, 1982).  The infinitely repeated game is
formulated on three solution concepts: 1) the Nash equilibrium solution, , or the solution that is ¯ ó
obtained when all players choose a “best response,”  2) the best strategy for each player,  , ˆ ói
irrespective of other players’ strategies, and 3) a mixed strategy outcome, ó*, derived when some
payers partially cooperate with the pool and free ride at the same time.  The three components of
this game theory model are the players, their strategies, and their payoffs for each strategy. There
are two players in this game: U.S. and Canadian farmers. The objective of the pool is to provide
incentives (efficiency gains) that make players better off by joining the pool.
There are two strategies for each player: U.S. farmers can either join the pool and be loyal
to the pool by providing all their output volume to the pool (C), or not join the pool or join the
pool and free-ride (CC); Canadian farmers can either join the pool (C), or not join the pool (DC). 
We assume there are no free-rider problems with Canadian farmers because of the single desk
selling role of the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB).  Based on these strategies, the players receive
payoffs (net revenue after deducting marketing cost) presented in Table 1.  The payoffs are
estimated using the Cournnot or non-cooperative model and the cartel or cooperative model. 
Payoffs a and e are cartel revenues for U.S. farmers who join the pool and have the pool market
all their grains.  Payoffs b and d are cartel revenues for Canadian farmers who join the pool and
have the pool market their grains. Payoffs c and g are Cournot payoffs for U.S. farmers who join
the pool and free ride (the pool only markets a portion of their grains).  Payoffs f and h are
Cournot payoffs for Canadian farmers who do not join the pool.  In the proceeding section we
develop three optimization models to derive, 1) the cartel payoffs (a, b, e, and d) for U.S. and
Canadian farmers, 2) a non-cooperative or cournot payoff (c and g) for U.S. farmers, and 3) a
non-cooperative or cournot payoff (f and h) for Canadian growers. 
Model 1: Pool Model for U.S./Canadian Farmers: The objective (equation 1) is to
maximize the expected payoff for U.S. and Canadian farmers jointly. In equation 1, Pt is the
expected price for low and high quality grains received by farmers from the U.S. domestic market
and the world market.
7  The net expected payoff for each player is the product of the quantity
supplied (Qkt) by that player and the expected price(Pt) less the unit marketing costs (UCkt).  The
unit marketing cost is quadratic in quantity.  The quadratic formulation provides differential
pricing for pool, non-pool members, and free riders. This formulation enables pool members to
capture most of the efficiency gains from pooling (like blending margins), while free riders and
non-pool members do not.  Although the main objective of cartels or pooling in the literature is to
reduce quantity and increase price, the quadratic formulation of unit costs focuses also on
increasing pool price with efficiency gains from grain blending and logistics.  Since net price5
received by farmers change from year to year based on supply responses by free riders, we
incorporate the time component to analyze variability of returns each year. 




(Pt& &UCkt)Qkt.                                                               (1)     
Where k stands for all US and Canadian producers who join the pool. This objective function is
maximized subject to the following constraints:
âk0& &âk1Qtk ’ ’ Pt.                                                                 (2)
Equation 2 is the inverse demand equation. This imposes the restriction that enables prices to
decrease as the players increase their wheat supply. Without this restriction, supply will increase
indefinitely.  The coefficients âk0  and âk1 are estimated using historic data from the National
Agricultural Statistic Service (NASS).
Q
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Qkt ’ ’ 0.                                                                (3)
Equation 3 defines total quantity supplied, Q* as the sum of supply from pool members, non-pool
members, and free riders from the US and Canada. Equation 4 is a lag supply reaction function.
äk0% %äk1(Pt& &1& &UCk,t& &1)% %äk2Qk,t& &1 ’ ’ Qkt.                                                                    
It limits the supply for any given year as a function of net expected price and quantity in the
previous year. The supply response coefficients äk0, äk1, and äk2 are estimated from historic NASS





tk ’ ’ UCkt,                                                               (5)
where the coefficients Ük0, Ük1, and Ük2 are estimated from historic NASS data. The unit marketing
cost, UCkt is the marketing, logistics, and administrative costs of running the pool (Koo et al.
1999).  This constraint and equation 6 impose restrictions that enable pool members to incur a
lower per unit marketing cost than non-pool members. The cost is structured in a manner that
permits pool members to enjoy the lowest costs on the quadratic cost curve (equation 5).  In
practice pool members will receive  quantity and quality premium from blending and other logistic
advantages (Fulton and Hucq; and Johnson and Nganje).
8  Free riders and non-pool members
incur higher per unit cost because individually they do not enjoy efficiency gains from blending
and logistics.  An example is the quantity incentive.  If pool costs are maintained constant and the
volume of grains handled by the pool increases, then the pool will enjoy scale advantages.  These
advantages can be passed on to members proportionally to the quantities they supply to the pool. 
UCNP& &Premium ’ ’ UCp.                                                               (6)
Equation 6 imposes the restriction that penalizes non-pool members from benefitting from
blending and logistical advantages of the pool.  The unit cost for pool members (UCp ) is the
difference between the unit marketing cost for running the pool and the benefits from grain
blending and logistics.  With the assumption that, without the pool, pool members and non-pool
members face the same marketing costs, the unit cost for pool members is the difference between
the unit costs for non-pool members (UCNP ) and the Premium from blending and logistical6
benefits.  A premium range from 0- 21 cents per bushel was estimated based on crop quality data
from North Dakota Agricultural Statistics Service (NDASS) and discount schedules for a major
quality characteristic (DON).
9  Equation 1 was estimated using Gams software and the model was
feasible for net premiums greater than 4 cents per bushel.
Model 2: Cournot Model for U.S. Farmers: This model is used to estimate the revenue
of farmers who join the pool and market some grain outside of the pool or farmers who decide to
partially free-ride.  The objective is to maximize returns for free riders.
Max [Rev] ’ ’ j j
t
(Pt& &UCkt)Qkt.                                                               (7)     
Where K stands for all US growers who free ride.  Canadian farmers can either join the pool or
not because of the single desk selling on the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB).  This model is
constrained by equation 2 through 6 with an additional constraint for the cost incurred by free
riders.  Although free-riders incur fixed and operating expenses for running the pool, they enjoy
only partial efficiency for the portion of their gains marketed by the pool.  The quadratic cost
structure in equation 5, penalize farmers for acting as free riders.  The additional constraint is:  
Qk( ((UCNPF& &Pr)’ ’NonPool Cost.                                                                (8)
Equation 8 restricts non-pool members and free-riders in the U.S. to enjoy a premium Pr lower
than that enjoyed by pool members.  In practice, and in our GAMS formulation, this group of
farmers incurs all marketing costs for the portion of their grain they market out of the pool and
incur some pool cost for the portion they market through the pool, but enjoy efficiency gains only
for the portion of grains they market through the pool.  Consequently, the total premium they
receive (Pr) is lower than the premium received by pool members (Premium).  
Model 3: Cournot Model for Canadian Farmers: This model is used to estimate the
revenue of Canadian farmers if they do not join the pool.  They incur marketing costs (UCkt ).
Max [Rev] ’ ’ j j
t
(Pt& &UCkt)Qkt,                                                           (9)         
Where k is all Canadian or US farmers who do not join the pool.  This objective function is
maximized subject to an additional cost constraint given by:
Qk( (UCNP’ ’NonPool Cost.                                                           (10)
In equation 10 the farmers incur prevailing marketing costs and earn zero premium from pooling. 
This model is also estimated using GAMS software.  The estimated revenues are used to derive
solutions for the game theoretical model and conditions for sustainability of the pool. 
The analysis used historic price and quantity data from 1990 to 1999 reported by the
North Dakota and the National Agricultural Statistics Service(NDASS and NASS).
10  NASS has
data on the quantities produced and prices received by farmers for all durum and HRS wheat
producing States in the United States and the aggregate for the whole U.S.  NDASS provides
production and price data for durum and HRS across years and for all 9 North Dakota crop
reporting districts (NASS).  NASS also has data on total imports from Canada and total U.S.7
demand for HRS and durum wheat. These data were used to estimate the coefficients for
equations 2, 4, and 5 (Table 2).
Results and Discussion
The results from the cartel and Cournot outcomes are presented and discussed in this
section.  Results of the estimated payoffs for durum wheat are summarized in Table 3.  These
results indicate that the best response for U.S. and Canadian farmers is to cooperate (Play C and
C) and market durum wheat jointly in a voluntary pool (cartel solution or model 1).  Payoffs from
this strategy first order stochastically dominates the Cournot payoffs, if farmers do not join the
pool or serve as free riders.  The cartel payoff yields $4.48 per bushel for US and Canadian
farmers on average, as compared to $4.41 and $4.40 per bushel for free riders or farmers who do
not join the pool.  The highest aggregate farm income for US and Canadian durum wheat growers
is derived using the cartel strategy.  Similar results are obtained for HRS wheat (Table 4).  The
differences in payoffs and efficiency gains for durum and HRS wheat are due to the fact that the
pool is able to internalize greater benefits from grain blending and logistical advantages by
handling larger volumes of durum wheat, compared to HRS wheat.  Estimated net revenues for
durum and HRS wheat are greatest for pool members, followed by free riders, and non pool
members. 
Figures 3 and 4 present the estimated efficiency gains for durum and HRS wheat with
increases in the wheat pool size.  Efficiency gains for durum wheat increases as the pool’s market
share increases and attains a maximum value of $0.276/bu when the pool controls about 65%
market share.  The results are consistent with net returns for small and large grain elevators,
reported on SIC code 5153.  It should be noted also that, as the pool handles larger volumes of
grains, its efficiency gains increase.  Efficiency gains for HRS wheat increase as the pool’s market
share increases, but estimates are smaller than those for durum wheat because the pool is
anticipated to handle a larger durum wheat market share.  The pool should envisage efficiency
gains from blending and logistical advantages as potential long-run strategies for durum and HRS
wheat, rather than relying entirely on market power.   
Conditions for Sustainability: Suppose the players are not certain that the pool will
institute cooperation between U.S. and Canadian farmers forever (T = +4) and sustain long-run
efficiency gains and higher prices.  In other words, the participants are not positive that they will
cooperate in the last period (Tn) even if they enjoy efficiency gains from cooperation in the prior
periods.  This is a serious question because players and pool members may be faced with
opportunities that provide higher returns than the pool’s returns in the short-run.  They may be
enticed by these opportunities and not join the wheat pool (DC or CC).  
In this section, the Baby version of the Folk Theorem, introduced in the methodology
section, is used to show that cooperation between U.S. and Canadian farmers (C) is the dominant
strategy at period Tn.  There are two ways this can be demonstrated.  First, the results in Table 3
and 4 are extended to cover n periods.  The revenue at period Tn is discounted for each player
using the net present value formula.  This implies that the players are maximizing the present
value of returns and consequently, there is no last period.  The solution of the problem is simple
and straightforward.  At time t=0 players cooperate with the pool and earn higher returns.  At t >
0, if non-cooperation has been played by either player, the other player plays non-cooperation as8
well or else cooperate.  The punishment strategy is to cooperate until the other player, doesn’t
and play non-cooperation forever.  The net present value solution to this problem is to cooperate
in period Tn.  We used five periods in our Gams model to estimate the payoffs and discounted this
returns using 8.5% discount rate (prevailing rate for wheat growers).  The results showed the
Nash equilibrium strategy for both players was still to cooperate and join the pool.  As the number
of periods increases, cooperation is still the best strategy if the discount rate is not too large.
11
This model incorporated supply response, based on price elasticities of supply and demand for
durum and HRS wheats.  
In the second proof, we used the three solution concepts (Nash equilibrium solution, ; ¯ ó
the best strategy for each player,  ; and the mixed strategy outcome ó*) to show that the ˆ ói
punishment strategy (not enjoying the efficiency gains from pooling ) is greater than the deviation
strategy or not joining the pool.  That is, the expected utility of the punishment strategy is greater
than the expected utility of the deviation strategy (EU(PSi) ￿EU(DEV), (See Appendix 1 for
mathematical derivation.)  
The results reveal that the Nash equilibrium outcome for the game is for the US and
Canadian farmers to cooperate.  For U.S. and Canadian farmers, cooperating with the pool
strongly dominates non-cooperating (players receive $4.48 and $3.23 per bushel as opposed to
$4.41 and $3.18 for durum and HRS wheat respectively).  The best strategy for either player,
independent of the other player’s strategy, is to cooperate or join the pool.  The payoffs are the
same as in the Nash equilibrium case.  Finally, the dominant mixed strategy profile for each player
is $4.48 and $3.21 per bushel for durum and HRS wheat respectively.  Therefore, if the pool




This paper develops a game theory optimization model of market efficiency to derive
conditions under which voluntary pooling is sustained for US/Canada durum and hard red spring
wheat producers.  The results reveal that the Nash equilibrium outcome for the game is for the US
and Canadian farmers to form a wheat pool.  The benefits of pooling are greatest for durum wheat
as compared to HRS wheat.  In addition, the game theory dynamic analysis reveals that players
will cooperate and join the pool if they believe it will last indefinitely.  Using supply response and
results from sensitivity analysis of model findings, it can be concluded the wheat pool will increase
net farm income, but requires four to five years to cover setup expenses and be self sustaining in
the long run.  Although, the wheat pool may be economically viable, legal and policy barriers may
impede such a structure.  The North American Bison Cooperative is an example of U.S./Canada
pool that has improved marketing efficiency for U.S./Canadian farmers. A major limitation at this
time may be due to the presence of the Canadian Wheat Board.  Although proponents of the
CWB suggest that voluntary pooling will be infeasible because of free rider problems, this article
presents a game theory approach that can be used to resolve that issue.  Also, arguments against
voluntary pooling have only evaluated the effectiveness of the pool from a market power
standpoint without considering market efficiency gains.  With the institution of the FAIR Act in
1996, US farmers need alternative strategies to increase and sustain farm income rather than
continue reliance government subsidies.  The study suggests the use of a voluntary pooling as an9
alternative means to increase net farm income by increasing marketing efficiency of wheat
growers in the United States and Canada.  10
Appendix 1
1. Let r = (ui, 3i)iEI be the strategic form of a game.  Suppose   is a NE strategy profile for ¯ ó
r.  Let ó* be a strategy profile satisfying ui (ó*) > ui  (￿iEI).  Let   be a strategy for (¯ ó) ˆ ói





2. Now consider the following strategy for player i at t = 0; play  . ó
(
i
At t $1; i I ó* was realized in all previous periods, play   otherwise play   . ó
(
i ¯ ói
Denote the above strategy by PSi (punishment strategy).
3. We would like to show that PS is a subgame, perfect equilibrium strategy profile.
Suppose player i plays   at t # t -1, and decides to deviate at time t.  Then we have ó
(
i
t 0 1 2  . . . . . t - 1 t t + 1 . . . . .  
i c c c  . . . . .  c deviate  . . . . .  ¯ ó&i
others c c c . . . .     . . . . .  ¯ ó&i ¯ ó&i
By deviating from PSi  at time t, the best player i can get is
. EU(DEV) ’ j
t&1
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If player i sticks to PSi , then he gets
. EU(PSi) ’ j
t&1
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Table 1. Strategies and Payoffs of Pool and non-pool members and free riders 
U.S. Farmers(1)/Canadian Farmers(2) Join pool (C) Join pool and Free Ride (CC)
Join pool (C) a, b c, d
Don’t Join pool (DC) e, f g, h
 a, b, c, d, e, f, g, and h are payoff received by farmers if they adopt the different strategies.13
Table 2. Estimated Coefficients for Equations 2, 4, and 5. 
Coefficients for Inverse
Demand Equation 2








Equation 5 (Values in
parenthesis are T-Ratios)
6.31* (28.42) 19.889** (39.01)  2.343* (7.43)
-0.0135** (-0.41) 22.908 (12.04) -0.0423**(0.09)
R
2 = 69.2% -0.0144* (0.15) 0.000135*(0.0014)
R
2 = 88.4% R
2 = 91.3%
* and ** imply significance at the 1% and 5% level respectively. 14
Table 3.  Estimated for Revenues (million $) for Durum Wheat Pool for All Player and their
Strategies 
U.S. Farmers/Canadian Farmers Join Pool (C)
Quantity (57.76 Million
bushels)










Don’t Join Pool (DC)Quantity
(25.13 Million bushels)




The numbers in parentheses are dollars per bushel received from each strategy.  15
Table 4.  Estimated for Revenues (million $) for HRS Wheat Pool for All Player and their
Strategies 
U.S. Farmers/Canadian Farmers Join Pool (C)
Quantity (140.93 Million
bushels)




(C)Quantity (45 Million bushels)
452.39 , 145.35 
(3.21), (3.23)
305.44 , 145.35 
(3.18), (3.23)
Don’t Join Pool (DC)Quantity
(45 Million bushels)




The numbers in parentheses are dollars per bushel received from each strategy.  16


























































































































FiFigure 4. Estimated Efficiency Gains Versus Pool’s Market Share for HRS Wheat20
1. In 1999, government emergency and disaster payments for North Dakota was about $850
million (NDASS, 1999).  Total disaster and insurance payments were $1.2 billion for about
31,000 farmers.  Declining price trends might affect long-run global competitiveness of U.S.
growers because other major wheat producing nations and regions like Australia and the
European Union have been experiencing increases in wheat exports (NASS, 1998). 
2. Although ND produces 85% and 50% of total U.S. durum and HRS wheat, the U.S. imports
25  and 45 million bushels of durum and HRS wheat respectively from Canada.  With Canada
being a major supplier of durum and HRS to the U.S. a pool may operate more effectively with
Canadian participation since the volume managed by the pool maybe crucial for its survival.    
3. A potential structure for the pool if created, will be like a cooperative. This will legally protect
the pool from antitrust-monopolistic liabilities.  An example of such a structure is the California
Rice Pool.  Vercammen, Fulton, and Hyde (1996) developed a nonlinear pricing schemes for
agricultural cooperatives that can be used as incentives to attract members.  A nonlinear
marketing cost scheme will be used in this study to provide incentives for pool members.  
4.The price elasticities of supply for durum wheat are 0.86 in ND and 0.98 for other regions in the
U.S.  The elasticity for spring wheat is 0.03 for ND and the rest of the U.S. Therefore, if prices
for durum increase, supply may increase proportionately to the benefit of free riders.  
5. There are very few grain companies(ADM, ConAgra, Cargill, among others) with the majority
of the market share.  Also, the participation of these companies in the US domestic market and
the world market creates imperfect competition in the grain merchandising and processing
industry.    
6. Johnson and Nganje (1999) discussed the impact of scab infested grains from 1993-98 for the
U.S. malting barley industry and analyzed blending opportunities under conditions of uncertainty. 
A similar model will be used to estimate blending opportunities for durum and HRS for the pool. 
7. Although farmers receive low and high prices for low and high quality grain, there have been
several grain blending studies (Fulton and Hucq, 1996; and Johnson and Nganje, 1999) that have
analyzed the benefits of blending.  In some instances grain handlers and merchandisers buy low
quality grains for a discount and blend them with high quality grains that meet acceptable quality
specifications and sell for prevailing market prices.  
8. Although, pool members incur the expenses of running the pool, they receive a premium for the
quantity and quality of grains they supply to the pool.  Given the volume of grain the pool will
handle and its marketing expertise it will be adept to blend off low quality grains and return a
premium to its members.
9.  There are three methods used to approximate blending margins and logistical incentives from
pooling.  First, the net margin for small and large Grain Elevators (SIC code 5153) gives a range
of 3 to 22 cents per bushel. The net margin for grain cleaning (SIC code 0723) ranged from 1.8 to
13.5 cents per bushel. Second, personal communication with industry officials revealed that21
blending margins for DON or scab affected grains can range from 0 to 23 cents per bushel.  It
should be noted that, during 1991-1997, producers in scab affected regions in the U.S. suffered a
cumulative $1.3 billion loss.  Losses for durum and HRS were estimated to be $73 and $806
million respectively. Scab accounts for more than 30 percent of total grain discounts (Demcey and
Nganje). Finally, prior blending models developed by Johnson and Nganje (1999) were used to
estimate a range of 1.5 to 12.2 cents per bushel.  The Gams model uses a loop formulation to
determine premium levels for the pool.  At 4 cents per bushel and higher, the pool provides
significant incentives for members and punishment for non members.
10. North Dakota produces about 85 percent of the durum wheat and 50 percent of the hard red
spring wheat produced in the United States.  North Dakota’s market share for durum wheat is
about 60 percent and 40 percent for HRS of U.S. consumption.  The United State imports about
24 million bushels of durum wheat and 45 million bushels of HRS from Canada annually.   
11.  The difference between the Present Value with cooperation and without cooperation is 
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12. EU(PSi) ￿EU(DEV) <=>
  
In this particular game the three solution concepts reveal that cooperating to form a wheat
pool is the best strategy.  This implies that the right-hand side is zero.  Since the discount
rate will always be greater than zero, efficiency gains from pooling may be significant to
sustain the pool.  